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Abstract: 
 
The fertility declines and increased longevity associated with the final phase of the global 
demographic transition have led to accelerated ageing of populations in developed countries and in 
several advanced developing countries.  This paper introduces a global demographic model from 
which emerge the implications of these changes for population sizes, age distributions and gender 
compositions.  From these results are inferred corresponding changes in labour force size and in 
patterns of consumption and saving which are then analysed using an augmented GTAP-Dynamic, 
in which regional households are disaggregated into four age groups and two genders.  
Demographic change is found to act most significantly through variations across age-gender groups 
in both labour force participation and savings behaviour, with secondary effects arising from 
variations in consumption preferences across these groups.  As policies to control ageing in the 
developed countries, increased labour force participation by the aged and replacement migration are 
examined and shown to have very considerable effects on global economic performance. 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent changes in global demographic behaviour, including to fertility, mortality, migration 
and the sex ratio at birth, have been considerable and many of these were not widely anticipated in 
recent decades.  In most countries, consistent with the central phase of the global demographic 
transition, infant mortality fell through the course of the last century and adult life expectancy 
increased, causing a surge of population growth.  The declines in birth rates anticipated as part of 
the final phase of this transition have been particularly sharp, first in developed countries and 
recently in many developing countries.1  Before this century is half over, populations in Japan and 
some European countries are likely to be smaller than they were in 1990, with these declines in total 
populations being preceded by declines in the number and proportion of people of working age.2
 The economic implications of these demographic trends and uncertainties are the subject of 
an already substantial global literature.  At minimum, this literature spans demography (McDonald 
and Kippen 2001, Booth et al. 2002), population economics (Lee 2003; Mason 2003), public 
economics (OECD 1996, 1998), economic history (Bloom and Williamson 1997; Williamson 
1998), growth economics (Barro and Becker 1989) and macroeconomics (Bryant and McKibbin 
1998, 2001; Faruqee and Muhleisen 2002; Bryant et al. 2003).  The latter macroeconomic research3 
has been path-breaking in that it has demonstrated the very substantial implications of demographic 
                                                 
1 IMF (2004: Chapter 3), Lee (2003). 
2 Bryant and McKibbin (1998), United Nations (2003). 
3 Much of this research was organised under a project coordinated by the Brookings Institution in the United States and 
involving staff from the International Monetary Fund.  Finance is from the Economic and Social Research Institute of 
the Japanese Cabinet Office. 
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change in some regions for the economic performance of others.  Its focus has, however, been on 
the industrialised regions of the northern hemisphere.  Additionally, while it uses an innovative 
approach to the integration of demographic information into macroeconomic models (Faruqee and 
Muhleisen), this approach falls short of complete demographic modelling and does not lend itself to 
explicit consideration of migration flows and their determinants. 
This paper examines the economic implications of demographic change using a complete 
demographic model on 14 regions, which is constructed as integral with a dynamic model of the 
global economy.  The latter model is a development of GTAP-Dynamic in which regional 
households are disaggregated by age group and gender.4  Compared with other studies of global 
demographic change, our global scope combined with the explicit incorporation of a demographic 
sub-model facilitates emphasis on migration flows.  And these are increasingly important.  Indeed, 
for the industrialised economies, during this and subsequent decades total populations and labour 
forces will be more substantially influenced by migration than by natural population increase.5  
Additionally, for countries in which demographic changes will soon yield declining labour forces 
(continental Europe, Japan and even China), there will be pressure to substantially raise guest 
worker and net immigration rates.6  This new wave of migration flows will have important 
implications for economic structure and performance in those regions and globally. 
Our analysis offers a base line projection through 2030 which incorporates the final phase of 
the global demographic transition.  Populations and labour forces are projected to decline in Europe 
and Japan, and to begin declining before the end of this period in China and elsewhere in East Asia.  
The effects of alternative demographic scenarios are then considered.  First, we imagine that life 
expectancy beyond 60 grows faster than anticipated in all regions of the world.  This follows the 
conjecture by Booth and others that some national projections of life expectancy may be 
pessimistic.7  Second, we consider that the popular concern with the growth of aged dependency 
ratios induces governments to either raise retirement ages and, thereby, increase aged labour force 
participation rates or permit “replacement migration”.  Each of these scenarios causes significant 
departures from the base line and each has important implications for overall economic 
performance. 
                                                 
4 The GTAP-Dynamic model is a development of its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel et al. 1997).  Its 
dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000).  An earlier application of the standard model to the 
issues raised in this paper is that by Shi and Tyers (2004). 
5 For a summary of the impact of migration for all advanced economies, see IMF 2004: Figure 3.2.  For Australia, net 
immigration contributes substantially to overall population growth and is likely to do so to an increasing extent (Khoo 
and McDonald 2002, 2003). 
6 See United Nations (2000) for a treatment of replacement migration in Europe.  Further discussion of the European 
case is offered by Tani (2003) and Hatton and Tani (2003). 
7 See Booth (2004), Booth and Tickle (2003) and Booth et al. (2002).  A key point to emerge from these papers is that 
principal causes of death change through time as life styles change and medical science addresses new frontiers.  When 
the potential for successive medical breakthroughs is ignored, projections of death rates are pessimistic. 
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The key mechanisms by which demographic change affects overall economic performance 
operate on both the demand and supply sides.  Population growth raises aggregate demand, with 
relative price effects depending on income elasticities of demand and supply growth in each sector.  
In models of the Solow-Swan type, where endogenous growth takes the form of physical capital 
accumulation only, population growth raises GDP but reduces per capita income.  This tends to 
cause a demand shift away from income-elastic products, advantaging agriculture.  When 
population growth is associated with ageing, however, the composition of consumption also 
changes, with net effects on product and service demand that vary by age-gender group.  On the 
supply side, changes in the size and composition of the population correspondingly change the size 
and composition of the labour force, though as we show, these changes are most often far from 
proportionate.  Where this leads to an expansion of the labour force, the relative endowment of 
labour rises and labour intensive industries are advantaged, particularly manufacturing.  Finally, 
changes to the age distribution alter the average saving rate.  This changes the magnitude and global 
distribution of investment and hence the rates of economic growth in each region. 
In Section 2, the demographic model is introduced and its population and labour force 
projections are briefly discussed.  Section 3 describes the extension of the GTAP-Dynamic model to 
incorporate populations disaggregated by age and gender.  Section 4 then describes four scenarios 
for global demographic change through 2030: the base line, accelerated life expectancy, high aged 
participation and high migration scenarios.  The simulation results from each scenario are then 
compared and implications discussed for the performance of the global economy.  Section 5 then 
offers brief concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Demographic Sub-Model 
To capture the economic implications of demographic change it is cumbersome and 
unnecessary to carry the 20 five-year age groups used by the United Nations in its population 
projections.  We have settled on a model that tracks populations in four age groups and two 
genders: a total of 8 population groups in each of 14 regions.8  The four age groups are the 
dependent young, adults of fertile and working age, older working adults and the mostly-retired 
over-60s.  The resulting structure is displayed in Figure 1.  Each age-gender group is a 
homogeneous sub-population with group-specific birth and death rates and rates of both 
immigration and emigration.  If the group spans T years, the survival rate to the next age group is 
the fraction 1/T of its population, after group-specific deaths have been removed and its population 
has been adjusted for net migration.  The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life 
                                                 
8 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in dependency ratios.  For a 
more complete documentation of the sub-model, see Chan and Tyers (2004). 
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expectancy at 60, which varies across genders and regions.  The key parameters, then, are birth 
rates, sex ratios at birth, age and gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates and life 
expectancies at 60. 
 Immigration and emigration are also age and gender specific.  The model represents a full 
matrix of global migration flows for each age and gender group.  Each of these flows is currently 
set at a constant proportion of the population of its destination group.  The only exception to this is 
in experiments where migration flows are adjusted to meet a policy objective such as the retention 
of a desired aged dependency ratio.  Migration flows are therefore driven by population growth in 
the destination region.  One rationale for this strong assumption is that countries are better able to 
cope with migrants’ adjustment costs when flows are kept to particular fractions of indigenous 
populations.9
 
Sources and structure: 
 The demographic sub-model and the economic model both cover 14 regions.10  This 
regional structure is designed so as to single out countries that are populous or groups of countries 
of particular demographic and economic interest.  Key parameters in the model are the migration 
rates, , birth rates, RagrdM
t
rB , sex ratios at birth, , death rates, , and the life expectancy at 
60, 
t
rS , ,
t
a m rD
60 , ,
t
g rL + .  The migration rates are based on recent migration records
11 and are held constant 
through time.12
 
Asymptotic trends in key parameters: 
 The birth rates, life expectancy at 60 and the age specific mortality rates all trend through 
time asymptotically.  For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target rate is 
identified.  The parameters then approach these target rates with initial growth rates determined by 
historical observation.  In year t the birth rate of region r is: 
(1) ( )(0 0 0 1t tr r Tgt r )B B B B eβ= + − −  , 
where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the historical growth rate: 
                                                 
9 On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that migration flows have been inversely proportional to indigenous 
population growth, driven for example by the need to maintain labour forces in the face of declining rates of natural 
increase.  Our modelling of migration behaviour is readily altered to allow for a variety of economic and policy related 
incentives. 
10 See Chan et al. (2005: Table 1) and Shi and Tyers (2005) for the regional aggregation in detail. 
11 Records of gross migration flows are weak at best in most countries.  Destinations are therefore restricted in this 
model to Australia, Western Europe and North America, where at least some relevant records are kept.  Although the 
model represents a complete flow matrix, only these three regions receive non-zero inflows. 
12 The migration rates and the corresponding birth rates are listed in detail in Chan et al. (2005: Tables 2-5). 
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(2) 
( )( )0 01 00
0 0
1Tgt rr r
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r r
B B eB BBx
P B
β− −−= =&& , so that 
(3) 
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0 0
ˆ
ln 1 r r
Tgt r
B P
B B
β ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 . 
The birth and death rates and the live expectancies at 60, thus calculated, are presented in detail by 
Chan et al. (2005). 
 
Labour force projections: 
To evaluate the number of “full-time equivalent” workers we first construct labour force 
participation rates, Pa,g,r by gender and age group for each region from ILO statistics on the 
“economically active population”.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are part time 
and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work.  The result is the 
number of full time equivalents per worker, Fa,g,r.  The labour force in region r is then: 
(4) 
60
, ,
1539
f
t t
r a
a g m
L
+
= =
= ∑ ∑ g rL  where  . , , , , , , , , ,t t t ta g r a r a g r a g r a g rL P F Nµ=
Here ,
t
a rµ  is a shift parameter reflecting the influence of policy on participation rates.  The time 
superscript on  refers to the extrapolation of observed trends in these parameters., ,
t
a g rP
13
 
Asymptotic trends in labour force participation: 
For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target country is identified whose 
participation rate is approached asymptotically.  The rate of this approach is determined by the 
initial rate of change.  Thus, the participation rate takes the form: 
(5)  , ( )(0 0 0, , , , , , 1t ta g r a g r Tgt a g rP P P P eβ= + − − )
where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the initial participation growth rate: 
(6) 
( )( )0 01 0 , ,, , , ,0
, , 0 0
, , , ,
1ˆ Tgt a g ra g r a g r
a g r
a g r a g r
P P eP P
P
P P
β− −−= = , so that 
(7) 
0 0
, , , ,
0 0
, ,
ˆ
ln 1 a g r a g r
Tgt a g r
P P
P P
β ⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 . 
Target rates are chosen from countries considered “advanced” in terms of trends in participation 
rates.  Where female participation rates are rising, therefore, Norway provides a commonly chosen 
target because its female labour force participation rates are higher than for other countries.14
                                                 
13 Although part time hours may well also be trending through time, we hold F constant in the current version of the 
model. 
14 The resulting participation rates are listed by Chan et al. (2005: Table 10). 
 6
 
Accounting for part time work: 
 For each age group, i, gender group, g, and region, r, full-time equivalency depends on the 
fraction of participants working full time, fa,g,r, and, for those working part time, the ratio of average 
part time hours to full time hours for that gender group and region, rg,r.  For each group, the ratio of 
full time equivalent workers to total labour force participants is then 
(8) . ( ), , , , , , ,1a g r a g r a g r g rF f f r= + −
Preliminary estimates of fa,g,r and rg,r are approximated from OECD (1999: Table 1.A.4) and OECD 
(2002: Statistical Annex, Table F).15
 
The aged dependency ratio: 
We define and calculate four dependency ratios: 1) a youth dependency ratio is the number 
of children per full time equivalent worker, 2) an aged dependency ratio is the number of persons 
over 60 per full time equivalent worker, 3) a non-working aged dependency ratio is the number of 
non-working persons over 60 per full time equivalent worker, and 4) a more general dependency 
ratio is defined that takes as its numerator the total non-working population, including children.16  
That of interest here is the one of most widespread policy interest, the non-working aged 
dependency ratio.  Where  is the population in year t of age group a, gender g, in region r: , ,
t
a g rN
(9) 
( )60 , , 60 , ,
,
f
t t
g r g
g mANW
r t t
r
N L
R
L
+ +
=
−
=
∑ r
                                                
 . 
 
The base line population projection: 
 The regional levels and age structures of the base line population projections accord closely 
with corresponding United Nations projections, notwithstanding our simple, four-age-group 
model.17  Corresponding base line projections of labour force levels and age structure are 
summarised in Table 1, showing substantial ageing of labour forces in all regions.  Indeed, the 
extent of the widespread ageing is especially clear from the trends in non-working aged dependency 
ratios listed in Table 2.  Finally, base line projections of total populations and labour forces for a 
selection of regions are displayed in Figure 2.  The latter show divergences in the growth paths of 
 
15 No data has yet been sought on part time work in non-OECD member countries.  In these cases the diversity of 
OECD estimates is used to draw parallels between countries and regions and thus to make educated guesses.  The 
results are listed by Chan et al. (2005: Tables 11 and 12). 
16 All these dependency ratios are defined in detail by Chan et al. (2005). 
17 See United Nations (2003) and the detailed comparison provided in Chan et al. (2005). 
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populations and labour forces that are particularly important in projecting effects of economic 
performance. 
 
3. Extensions to the Standard GTAP Dynamic Model 
To capture the economic consequences of the projected demographic changes, we adapt a 
standard long-term dynamic model of the world economy, namely GTAP-Dynamic (Ianchovichina 
and McDougall, 2000).  Its structure enables us to capture the economic effects of population and 
labour force growth changes in the long run.  Yet the single regional households of standard GTAP-
Dynamic are a major weakness.  To capture the effects of demographic change we have included 
multiple age and gender groups in line with the structure of the demographic sub-model (Figure 1).  
These eight age-gender groups differ in their consumption preferences, saving rates, labour supply 
and skill composition.  This extension allows the model to capture not only the aggregate impact of 
population growth, but also the effects of ageing. 
Unlike the standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private 
consumption, government consumption and total saving via an upper level Cobb-Douglas function, 
we first divide regional income between government consumption and total private disposable 
income.  That income is then split between the eight age-gender groups in a manner informed by 
empirical studies of age and gender specific income and expenditure behaviour.  For each age-
gender group we then use a Keynesian consumption equation to split disposable income between 
saving and consumption expenditure.18  Saving rates differ by group as does the responsiveness of 
per capita consumption expenditure to per capita disposable income in each group.  Once 
consumption expenditure is known, the standard GTAP CDE19 consumption preferences are applied 
for each group, with parameters varying to reflect age-gender differences in tastes. 
 
Income Splitting: 
The first step is to split government from private disposable income.  For this we retain the 
original Cobb-Douglas system, this time in a two-way split, and the governments’ income shares 
from the original database.20  Total regional disposable income is then split between the eight age-
gender groups.  For this we draw from other studies the distribution of disposable income between 
age-gender groups for “typical” advanced and developing countries.  To ensure that changes in the 
age-gender distribution of each region’s population alter the corresponding age-gender distribution 
                                                 
18 This is an empirically based reduced form approach to the underlying intertemporal optimization problem solved by 
individuals in each group. 
19 This refers to the “constant difference of elasticities of substitution” demand system.  See Huff et al. (1997). 
20 This implies the assumption that all governments balance their budgets and that all saving in the original database is 
private. 
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of income, we define a set of weights, , that represent the ratio of the per capita disposable 
income of group (a, g), to that of the (15-39, m) group, chosen as an arbitrary standard.
, ,a g rW
21  The share 
of the disposable income of region r enjoyed by people of gender g, and age group a is thus: 
(10) , , , , , ,60
, , , ,
0 15
D
a g r a g r a g r
fD
r
a g r a g r
a g m
Y W N
Y W N
+
= − =
=
∑ ∑
 . 
The adopted values of  are listed in Table 3.  Their selection is guided by the empirical studies 
of the age distribution of income and consumption noted in the table. 
, ,a g rW
 
Splitting savings and consumption expenditure from group disposable income: 
 Our reduced form approach to the intertemporal optimisation problem faced by each 
individual centres on an exponential consumption equation that links group per capita consumption 
expenditure to per capita disposable income and the real interest rate, r: 
(11) , , , ,, ,
, , , , , , , ,
c
r
D
a g r a g r
a g r rC C
a g r a g r a g r a g r
C Y
c A
N P N P
ε
rε
⎛ ⎞= = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 , 
where  is a group consumption price index, group consumption expenditure is  and 
parameters 
, ,
C
a g rP , ,a g rC
cε  and rε  are income and interest elasticities.  This equation is calibrated for each group 
and region based on the set of initial (1997) age-specific saving rates from per capita disposable 
income listed in Table 4.  These estimates are drawn from the same empirical studies of the age 
distribution of income and consumption as the income weights of Table 3.  They are recalibrated for 
consistency with the overall private saving rate in each region indicated in the GTAP database.22
 
                                                 
21  To date we have not realised the opportunity to have the age-gender distribution of income depend on the income’s 
factor origin.  Despite intuition suggesting a link, such as that the aged in advanced countries receive retirement income 
stemming from capital ownership, consistent empirical work on this distribution is unavailable. 
22  The elasticities of consumption expenditure to disposable income suggested by the empirical literature seem to be 
poor choices as reduced forms for saving behaviour in the long term since they imply high marginal saving rates.  We 
calibrate these elasticities according to the following scenario: (a) North American per capita disposable income grows 
at 3%/yr for 100 years, (b) growth in all other regions is sufficient to attain North America’s per capita disposable 
income levels within that period, (c) when the other regions catch up, all regions attain identical group-specific saving 
rates, and (d) the income, consumption and saving transitions are smooth and exponential.  Our reduced form 
consumption equation (11) can be simplified for a single age-gender group to: c rc A y rε ε=  , where c is per capita 
consumption expenditure, y is per capita disposable income and r is the real interest rate.  To focus on the key elasticity, 
cε , imagine that the real interest rate is constant through time, so that the interest term can be embedded in the constant.  
Then, if per capita disposable income grows at rate, yg , the rate of growth of consumption expenditure is c ygε .  And, 
if per capita consumption expenditure is initially  and per capita disposable income is initially ,we can calculate 
the group’s average saving rate in period t and invert the resulting expression to find the elasticity that is consistent with 
the target saving rate after T years: 
0c 0y
0
111 ln
1
T
c
y
s
g T s
ε ⎛ ⎞−= + ⎜ −⎝ ⎠⎟
.  For further detail, see Shi and Tyers (2005). 
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Consumption preferences: 
The construction of the CDE demand system requires the calibration of two sets of parameters by 
the method detailed by Huff et al. (1997).  Its advantage over the CES, or constant elasticity of 
substitution, system is that it is non-homothetic and therefore allows income elasticities of demand 
to vary between commodities.  Elasticities of demand then depend on CDE “expansion” and 
“substitution” parameters, which are calibrated for each region’s aggregate household in the GTAP 
Database.  We retain the calibrated values of these parameters for the eight age-gender groups.  To 
complete the demand system we then need expenditure shares for each of the eight different age-
gender groups in each region. 
For these shares we turn, once again, to the consumption analysis literature.  Studies of 
consumption preferences by age group are available for a few of the identified countries and those 
are used as a guide in the construction of the complete matrix of expenditure shares listed in Table 
5.  That by Weber et al. (2002) is the most detailed and it shows only very modest variation in 
expenditure shares by age group when commodities are highly aggregated.  Although there is 
considerable variation when comparisons are at a high level of detail, such as between fresh food 
and restaurant meals or between health and other services, the broad shares are remarkably 
similar.23  For presentational economy, we focus in this paper on the three product version. 24  Age-
gender group expenditure shares are drawn initially from the literature indicated in Table 5, then 
rendered consistent with group expenditures on the one hand and GTAP Database values for 
aggregate expenditure shares on the other by using RAS techniques to concord the shares with row 
and column sums in the matrix of expenditures. 
 
Elasticities of substitution: 
 It is well known that general equilibrium simulation results are particularly sensitive to the 
assumed degree of differentiation between home and foreign goods and services.  In models such as 
this one, where products are highly aggregated, some of this differentiation reflects regional 
differences in sectoral product composition.  Both the complementarity of product compositions 
and true regional product differentiation are therefore represented in the model via the choice of the 
elasticities of substitution between home and foreign products.  Controversy has raged over the 
merits of various estimates and the view is commonly expressed that the “standard” GTAP 
estimates, which range between 1.0 and 4.0, are too small.  We concur with this view since, when 
                                                 
23 It is of concern that some expenditure shares for detailed products and services appear to be changing very rapidly 
through time.  Weber et al. show that the health share is rising rapidly for the aged and that this is associated with very 
rapid growth in the share of expenditure on drugs by all groups but particularly the aged. 
24 The GTAP commodity classification is production-oriented, based on the International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC), and so it differs from the classification used in expenditure surveys.  We use the GTAP 
commodities throughout, weakening the sensitivity of our analysis to differences in preferences. 
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these elasticities are used, our base line simulation yields substantial divergence between the paths 
of home and trading prices in different regions.  In the absence of any new trade distortions, global 
markets appear far more segmented in 2030 than they are at present.  Newer estimates by Harrigan 
(1993), Trefler and Lai (1999) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) all support much higher values.  We 
therefore use 7.0 for food products, 4.0 for manufactures and 2.2 for the less tradeable services, and 
we retain the traditional “rule of two” for substitutability of imports by region of origin. 
 
4. Four Scenarios through 2030 
 The analysis to be presented is centred on the base line projection of populations, labour 
forces and their structures described in Section 2, and a corresponding base line economic 
projection from our modified GTAP-Dynamic.  Three other demographic scenarios are then 
introduced and populations and labour forces projected for each case using the demographic sub-
model.  Corresponding economic simulations are then constructed and each is compared with the 
base line scenario.  The alternative population scenarios are: 
1) Accelerated aging: life expectancies at 60 in all regions grow faster than in the base line case, 
by two per cent per year, consistent with the conjecture of Booth (2004) that projections of our 
base-line type may be too pessimistic about mortality. 
2) Increased aged participation: concern with the growth of aged dependency ratios in Western 
Europe, Japan, North America and Australia induces the governments of these regions to 
increase retirement ages so that aged labour force participation is just sufficient to hold non-
working aged dependency ratios constant from 2000 onwards. 
3) Replacement migration: similar concern in the advanced migrant-accepting regions of 
Western Europe, North America and Australia, induces the governments of these regions to 
permit sufficient “replacement” migration to hold non-working aged dependency ratios constant 
from 2000 onwards. 
Each of these scenarios causes significant departures from base line levels.  The accelerated 
aging scenario raises projected populations and labour forces and causes very large increases in 
projected non-working aged dependency ratios, as shown in Table 6.  With increased aged 
participation in the advanced economies sufficient to hold non-working aged dependency ratios 
constant, labour forces rise in the advanced economies, as indicated in Table 7.  This requires that 
60+ participation rates in the North America, Western Europe and Australia approach those 
currently observed in Japan, as shown in Figure 3.  The replacement migration solution requires still 
more dramatic change, as indicated in Table 8.  Migration rates would be required to increase 
many-fold and, particularly in North America, the resulting population growth would be extremely 
large.  Still more dramatic would be the impacts of this migration on the source regions, as 
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indicated in Figure 3.  Some, including Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, would have 
their working aged populations seriously depleted by 2020.  We discuss the economic consequences 
of each of these scenarios in turn. 
 
The base line: 
 The base line scenario provides a reference projection against which the others are 
compared.  It is particularly sensitive to assumptions about the sources of growth that are exogenous 
to the model.  These are summarised in the form of factor-specific productivity growth shocks that 
are presented in detail by Shi and Tyers (2005).25
 The productivity growth rates we adopt are disaggregated by primary factor to an extent 
rarely supported by the empirical studies but in a way that offers a more complete characterisation 
of productivity growth and the potential for further experimentation with technology.  They imply 
that agricultural productivity grows more rapidly than that in the other sectors in Australia, China, 
Indonesia, Other East Asia, India and Other South Asia.  In Australia, this is assumed to be due to 
increasing land productivity, while in the other regions it is due to increased labour productivity in 
agriculture and the associated shedding of labour to the other sectors.  In the other industrialised 
regions, the process of labour relocation has slowed down and labour productivity growth is slower 
in agriculture.  In the other developing regions, the relocation of workers from agriculture has 
tended not to be so rapid even in the poorest of these regions, so labour productivity in agriculture is 
assumed to grow more slowly. 
 Aside from exogenous productivity growth, a key aspect of the base line projection is the 
allocation of investment across regions.  The model takes no explicit account of investment risk and 
so tends to allocate investment to regions that have high marginal products of physical capital.  
These tend to be labour-abundant developing countries whose labour forces are still expanding 
rapidly.  It finds Indonesia a particularly attractive prospect for this reason, yet we know that risk 
considerations limit the flow of foreign investment into Indonesia at present and that these are likely 
to remain important in the future.  To account for this we have constructed a “pre-base line” 
simulation in which we maintain the relative growth rates of investment across regions.  In this 
simulation, global investment rises and falls but its allocation between regions is thus controlled.  A 
risk premium variable (GTAP Dynamic variable SDRORT) is made endogenous.  This creates 
                                                 
25 The empirical literature is inconsistent about productivity growth across sectors.  Ianchovichina et al. (2001) conclude 
from their own survey that productivity growth is generally faster in agriculture than in other sectors.  This is credible, 
particularly in rapidly growing developing countries where the agricultural workforce is declining, often rapidly, while 
agricultural output continues to grow.  More recent empirical studies focusing on advanced countries, such as those by 
the Productivity Commission (2001) and Stiroh (2001), suggest the opposite, however.  Since the early 1990s, 
productivity growth in the advanced regions appears to have been slower in agriculture than in manufacturing and 
services.  Our own survey of this literature suggests a set of factor productivity growth rates detailed in Shi and Tyers 
(2005). 
 12
wedges between the international and regional interest rates that imply high risk premia for the 
populous developing regions of Indonesia, India, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Premia 
tend to fall in other regions, where labour forces are falling or growing more slowly.26
 The final base line simulation then frees up investment, but maintains the time paths of the 
regional risk premia as exogenous.  As with the factor productivity growth rates, these risk premia 
are then held constant in all subsequent “policy” simulations.  In these simulations, no allowance is 
made for feedback from factor productivity, investment risk or economic performance more 
generally, to the underlying demographic shocks.  Overall base line economic performance is 
suggested by Figure 4, which shows the projected levels of GDP in selected regions.  Because of its 
continuing rapid population growth, India is projected to take over from China as the world’s most 
rapidly expanding region.  China grows rapidly nonetheless, as does Indonesia and “other East 
Asia”, while the older industrial economies continue to grow more slowly. 
 
Accelerated ageing: 
 The effect of this is to raise the population over 60 in every region, while leaving younger 
populations the same as in the base line.  GDP tends to increase everywhere because at least some 
of these additional aged people work and so labour forces rise.  Japan enjoys the largest GDP rise 
since the resulting absolute increase in its aged population is largest and since it has the highest 
aged labour force participation rate.  In North America, Western Europe, Central Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and Australia, accelerated ageing raises the share of income in the hands of the 
over 60s, who tend to have negative saving rates.  In these regions, therefore, average saving rates 
decline as shown in Figure 7.  Regions whose labour forces expand most as a consequence of 
accelerated ageing, and particularly Japan, enjoy increased real investment.  This investment is 
reassigned from China and Western Europe, whose labour forces are declining in part because their 
aged populations have lower labour force participation rates.  In all regions, however, aged 
dependency ratios rise (Table 6) and per capita incomes fall.  The tendency for older and poorer 
people to consume more basic food products, advantages the producers of the less income elastic 
food commodities yielding the increases in relative food prices and land rents shown in Table 9. 
 
Increased aged participation: 
 This raises labour forces in Australia, North America, Japan and Western Europe 
sufficiently to hold the line on non-working aged dependency ratios (Figure 9).  It does not change 
population sizes relative to the base line.  The leisure consequences of this change are ignored here.  
                                                 
26 Most spectacular is the fall in the Chinese premium.  This is because, in our base line projection, we maintain China’s 
currently high share of global investment despite the eventual decline in its labour force.  A possible consequence of 
this is that our base line investment in China, and therefore China’s projected economic growth rate, is optimistic. 
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As the supply of labour grows, crowding the fixed factors in the four affected regions, both land and 
natural resource rents increase substantially relative to wages (Table 10).  Indeed, wages most often 
fall relative to all prices and this advantages labour-intensive sectors, mainly manufacturing.  More 
abundant labour raises marginal products of physical capital in the affected regions and they 
therefore attract larger shares of global investment (Figure 10).  Again, the largest share of this 
investment is diverted from China in the long term.  Because their populations do not increase, the 
rise in incomes also raises per capita incomes in the four affected regions (Figure 11), though this 
comes at the cost of reduced leisure for the old.  This also shifts demand toward more income 
elastic manufactured products.  In the older industrial countries manufacturing sectors therefore 
expand relative to agriculture and services as do their manufactured exports.  There is no 
Rybczyinski contraction of other sectors, however.  Increased income raises global aggregate 
demand, so that output volume increases in all sectors of the affected regions, along with 
employment. 
 
Replacement migration: 
 Replacement migration requires the relocation of substantial parts of the populations of 
some destination regions, most particularly “Central Europe and the former Soviet Union” and the 
“Rest of the World” but also “Other East Asia”.  Their populations fall, most dramatically in the 
working age groups, so their labour forces and their economic outputs contract (Figures 12 and 15).  
The opposite is true of destination regions, and particularly North America.  Their GDP levels 
expand substantially, as indicated in Figure 15.  In the expanding regions there is a tendency for the 
real wage to fall, reducing the costs of tradeable goods and depreciating their real exchange rates.  
At the same time, this raises the marginal products of physical capital in these regions so that they 
attract greater shares of the world’s investment, further bolstering their growth.  The balance of 
payments effects of the new investment are offset by strong rises in average saving rates in the 
recipient regions and a substantial fall in saving in the “rest of the world”, where populations in 
high-saving age groups are depleted.  The regions of origin have higher real wages, reduced 
investment and real appreciations relative to the base line. 
 In this case, the tendency for population increases to suppress per capita income is offset at 
least partially for some regions by increased investment.  This is most prominent in Western 
Europe, for example, where the labour force would be larger by half in 2030, wages fall, and per 
capita income would be expected to fall also.  It does so but by only a few per cent over two 
decades.  In North America, however, investment also expands substantially but this is not 
sufficient to offset the weight of the increased population on per capita income.  The increased 
population pressure in these regions does, however, raise land and resource rents substantially as it 
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does the relative prices of food.  In the regions of origin, however, the opposite occurs.  Land and 
natural resource rents fall, as do relative food prices.27
 
5. Conclusion 
 An analysis of demographic change and labour force participation demonstrates that not 
only are the populations in several key regions, including Western Europe, Japan and China, likely 
to decline in the near future but that their labour forces are likely to decline sooner and more 
dramatically.  This will change their patterns of comparative advantage and hence the pattern of 
global trade.  More importantly, it will raise aged dependency ratios which will, in turn, stimulate 
policies to arrest the declines in their workforces, policies that may have far-reaching economic 
consequences.  These policies include increased labour force participation by the aged and 
expanded immigration. 
 This demographic analysis is combined with applications of a dynamic model of the global 
economy that has multiple age-gender groups.  The principal mechanisms by which demographic 
change affects economic performance are via the average saving rate, the size and age composition 
of the labour force and the product pattern of consumption expenditure.  Projected slower 
population growth worldwide tends to raise per capita incomes and to shift consumption away from 
less income elastic “food”.  If, as some demographers anticipate, life expectancies rise rapidly due 
to health science breakthroughs, however, this shift could be offset in the advanced countries and 
per capita incomes would rise more slowly.  Should governments seek to raise aged labour force 
participation rates, per capita incomes will increase while aged leisure consumption will decline.  
More investment will be attracted as a consequence, bolstering the gains to the high-participation 
regions at the expense of the rest of the world. 
 Replacement migration to regions with rising aged dependency would have very substantial 
demographic and economic impacts.  In recipient regions, real wage rates would fall and more 
investment would be attracted but the expanded population would further “crowd” fixed factors.  
Land and natural resource rents would therefore rise.  Only in Western Europe would the tendency 
for the increased population to suppress per capita income be substantially offset by the diversion of 
investment from other regions.  There, increased immigration suppresses per capita income only 
slightly, though even this occurs at the expense of output and income in other regions, particularly 
Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
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Figure 2: Base Line Population and Labour Force Projections 
 
Western Europe
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035
population
labourforce
Japan
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035
population
labourforce
 
 
 
China
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035
population
labourforce
India
0.95
1.05
1.15
1.25
1.35
1.45
1.55
1.65
1.75
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035
population
labourforce
 
 
 
 19
Figure 3: “Increased Aged Participation” and “Replacement Migration” Scenarios 
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Figure 4: Base Line GDP Growth 
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Figure 5: Base Line Prices and Unit Factor Rewards in North Americaa
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Figure 6: “Accelerated Ageing” Labour Force, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 7: “Accelerated Ageing” Average Saving Rate, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 8: “Accelerated Ageing” Investment, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 9: “Increased Participation” Labour Force, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 10: “Increased Participation” Investment, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 11: “Increased Participation” Per Capita Income, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 12: “Replacement Migration” – Labour Force, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 13: “Replacement Migration” Average Saving Rate, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 14: “Replacement Migration” Investment, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 15: “Replacement Migration” GDP, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Figure 16: “Replacement Migration” Income Per Capita, Departure from Base Line, % 
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Table 1: Base Line Projections of Labour Force Size and Structure 
 
 Labour forcea % Female % 40+ 
 Initial 2030 Initial 2030 Initial 2030 
Australia 8 10 37 40 42 48 
North America 182 250 40 42 42 47 
Western Europe 184 165 40 44 47 55 
Central Europe 181 148 47 46 44 53 
Japan 61 55 37 37 58 65 
China 570 592 37 36 34 47 
Indonesia 87 130 38 38 40 54 
Other East Asia 127 178 41 40 37 51 
India 356 594 27 28 36 47 
Other South Asia 134 265 28 28 32 44 
South America 123 193 38 39 33 48 
Mid East Nth Afr 103 176 24 23 30 42 
Sub-Saharan Afr 150 349 28 29 29 36 
Rest of World 79 131 36 34 38 48 
a  Measured in full time equivalent workers. 
Source: Projection using the demographic model described in the text, as presented in detail by Chan et al. (2005). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Base Line Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios 
 
 Non-working aged/working 
 Initial 2030 
Australia 0.35 0.54 
North America 0.24 0.36 
Western Europe 0.42 0.61 
Central Europe 0.29 0.42 
Japan 0.32 0.48 
China 0.19 0.44 
Indonesia 0.09 0.16 
Other East Asia 0.09 0.23 
India 0.12 0.23 
Other South Asia 0.09 0.18 
South America 0.16 0.29 
Mid East Nth Afr 0.15 0.33 
Sub-Saharan Afr 0.13 0.15 
Rest of World 0.15 0.27 
Source: Base period statistics constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2003) and simulation results 
from the demographic model described in the text. 
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Table 3: Income Weights, , by Age-Gender Group, ,a g rW
 
     0-14 15-39 40-59 60+
     Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Australia 0.60        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
0.60 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.67 0.67
North America 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.10 0.60 0.60
Western Europe 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.70
Central Europe, FSU 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.70 0.70
Japan 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.60 1.60 0.94 0.94
China 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.60 1.60 0.94 0.94
Indonesia 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.90 0.90
Other East Asia 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.60 1.60 0.94 0.94
India 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.90 0.90
Other South Asia 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.90 0.90
South America 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.10 1.10
Mid East Nth Africa 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.90 0.90
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.40 1.40 0.90 0.90
Rest of World 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0.67 0.67
Source: Compiled from studies of consumption behaviour on particular countries, including US and UK: Attanasio and Banks (1998), Attanasio et al. (1999); Japan: 
Kitamura et al. (2001: Table 1); Mexico (standard for Latin America and an indicator for some other developing regions):  Attanasio and Szekely (1998: 
Figure 1); New Zealand (standard for Australia and Western Europe): Gibson and Scobie (2001: Figure 1). 
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Table 4: Initial Saving Rates From Personal Disposable Income by Age Gender Group
 
Per cent 0-14 15-39 40-59 60+ 
     Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Australia 0        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
0 7 7 31 31 -5 -5
North America 0 0 14 14 19 19 -30 -30
Western Europe 0 0 10 10 39 39 -20 -20
Central Europe, FSU 0 0 4 4 18 18 -6 -6
Japan 0 0 24 24 28 28 22 22
China 0 0 35 35 40 40 31 31
Indonesia 0 0 23 23 34 34 23 23
Other East Asia 0 0 36 36 40 40 32 32
India 0 0 19 19 28 28 19 19
Other South Asia 0 0 7 7 10 10 7 7
South America 0 0 7 7 17 17 6 6
Mid East Nth Africa 0 0 8 8 19 19 7 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 2 2 6 6 2 2
Rest of World 0 0 5 5 23 23 -5 -5
Source:  Compiled from studies of consumption behaviour on particular countries, including Mexico: Attanasio and Szekely (1998); Japan: Kitamura et al. (2001); 
New Zealand: Gibson and Scobie (2001); US: Attanasio et al. (1999). 
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Table 5: Private Expenditure Shares by Age-Gender Group 
  0-14 15-39   40-59 60+
     Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Australia    Food 0.18        
        
        
        
0.18 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.18 0.18
                   Manufactures 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.74 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77
North America  Food 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.11
                   Manufactures 0.12        
        
        
0.12 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.09
                   Services 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.78 0.80 0.80
Western Europe  Food 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.18
                   Manufactures 0.12        
        
        
0.12 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.09 0.09
                   Services 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.73 0.73
Central Europe, FSU  Food 0.44 0.44 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.43 0.43
                   Manufactures 0.10        
        
        
0.10 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.07
                   Services 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.50 0.50
Japan         Food 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.17 0.17
                   Manufactures 0.07        
        
        
0.07 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.78 0.78
China         Food 0.47 0.47 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.47 0.47
                   Manufactures 0.13        
        
        
0.13 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.10 0.10
                   Services 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.43
Indonesia   Food 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.45 0.45
                   Manufactures 0.07        
        
        
0.07 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.50 0.50
Other East Asia  Food 0.30 0.30 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.29 0.29
                   Manufactures 0.10        
        
        
0.10 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.08 0.08
                   Services 0.60 0.60 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.63 0.63
India           Food 0.57 0.57 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.56 0.56
                   Manufactures 0.08        
        
        
0.08 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.06
                   Services 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.38 0.38
Other South Asia  Food 0.54 0.54 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.54 0.54
                   Manufactures 0.07        
        
        
0.07 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.39 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.41 0.41
South America    Food 0.36 0.36 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.36 0.36
                   Manufactures 0.10        
        
        
0.10 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.08 0.08
                   Services 0.53 0.53 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.57 0.57
Mid East Nth Africa   Food 0.39 0.39 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.38
                   Manufactures 0.07        
        
        
0.07 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.54 0.54 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.57 0.57
Sub-Saharan Africa   Food 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.45 0.45
                   Manufactures 0.07        
        
        
0.07 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.05 0.05
                   Services 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.50 0.50
Rest of World    Food 0.36 0.36 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.35 0.35
                   Manufactures 0.10        0.10 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.07 0.07
                   Services 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58 
Source:  Constructed with guidance from the results presented by: Abdel-Ghany and Sharpe (1997), Blisard (2001a and b), Blisard (2003), Case and Deaton (2002), Paulin (2000), Regmi 
et al. (2001) and Weber et al. (2002).  The shares are then modified using a RAS process to conform with aggregate expenditures by product in the GTAP database. 
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Table 6: Effects in 2030 of “Accelerated Ageing”a Compared with the Base Line Scenario 
 
per cent change Population Labour force Non-working 
aged dep ratio 
 Total 60+ Total 60+ Aged NW 
Australia 5.7 23.7 1.3 24.6 22.0 
North America 5.1 23.6 2.2 24.0 20.9 
Western Europe 7.5 25.8 2.3 26.3 22.9 
Central Europe 7.8 31.4 3.6 32.5 26.6 
Japan 7.4 21.4 5.5 22.1 14.8 
China 5.9 27.4 1.4 29.0 25.5 
Indonesia 4.5 31.0 4.7 31.2 25.0 
Other East Asia 4.4 25.8 3.5 26.1 21.4 
India 3.8 26.6 3.2 27.5 22.2 
Other South Asia 3.1 26.6 3.0 26.7 22.7 
South America 4.1 24.4 3.4 24.6 20.1 
Mid East Nth Africa 3.3 25.3 2.3 25.8 22.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 34.5 2.8 36.2 30.0 
Rest of World 3.6 20.1 3.3 21.0 15.8 
 a Growth in Target Life Expectancies at 60 by 2% per year 
 Source: Simulation results from the model described in the text. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Effects in 2030 of “Increased Aged Participation”a Compared with Base Line Scenario 
 
per cent change Population Labour force Non-working 
aged dep ratio 
 Total 60+ Total 60+ Aged NW 
Australia 0.0 0.0 13.0 248.3 -32.8 
North America 0.0 0.0 9.1 98.9 -31.3 
Western Europe 0.0 0.0 12.3 141.7 -29.0 
Central Europe 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 10.8 43.2 -30.2 
China 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Indonesia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other East Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
India 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other South Asia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
South America 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mid East Nth Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest of World 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 a To Retain Fixed Aged Dependency 
 Source: Simulation results from the model described in the text. 
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Table 8: Effects in 2020 of “Replacement Migration” a Compared with Base Line Scenariob
Per cent change Population Labour force Non-working 
aged dep ratio 
 Total 60+ Total 60+ Aged NW 
Australia 87.1 41.7 90.6 42.1 -25.7 
North America 113.7 65.0 121.8 63.9 -25.5 
Western Europe 46.8 18.9 52.9 19.0 -22.2 
Central Europe -42.1 -20.0 -45.8 -20.4 47.9 
Japan 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
China -5.3 -3.3 -5.5 -3.0 2.4 
Indonesia -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 
Other East Asia -22.7 -16.7 -23.3 -16.4 8.4 
India -4.6 -3.6 -4.6 -3.4 0.9 
Other South Asia -9.1 -8.2 -9.3 -7.6 0.8 
South America -8.6 -5.5 -9.0 -5.8 4.0 
Mid East Nth Africa -12.8 -10.1 -12.6 -9.5 2.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa -6.2 -7.0 -6.5 -6.7 -0.6 
Rest of World -78.2 -55.8 -80.7 -54.1 124.0 
 a  To retain fixed aged dependency. 
 b  The projections under the replacement migration scenario run only to 2020 since, beyond that, the migrations 
 more than deplete some age groups in source regions. 
 Source: Simulation results from the model described in the text. 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: “Accelerated Ageing” - Product and Factor Prices, per cent Departure from the Base 
Line in 2030a 
 
 Land rent Wage Res rent Food Manuf Services 
Australia 3.0 -0.6 -0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 
North America 5.2 -0.5 0.4 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
Western Europe 8.2 -0.8 -0.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 
Central Europe, FSU 6.5 -1.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 
Japan 8.3 -0.8 1.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 
China 2.4 -2.7 -1.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.5 
Indonesia 4.3 -2.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 -0.2 
Other East Asia 3.6 -1.8 -0.1 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 
India 3.0 -1.9 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 
Other South Asia 2.9 -1.8 0.5 0.6 -0.2 -0.4 
South America 5.1 -1.3 0.9 0.4 -0.2 -0.4 
Mid East Nth Africa 5.5 -1.3 -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.0 -0.7 0.8 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 
Rest of World 4.1 -1.6 0.5 0.3 -0.1 -0.3 
 a All prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices. 
 Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text. 
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Table 10: “Increased Participation” - Product and Factor Prices, per cent Departure from the 
Base Line in 2030a 
 
 Land rent Wage Res rent Food Manuf Services 
Australia 13.7 -1.2 10.2 1.0 0.6 -0.1 
North America 8.2 0.7 8.1 0.8 0.2 0.0 
Western Europe 12.3 -0.9 9.4 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Central Europe, FSU -3.3 -1.4 -2.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.0 
Japan 7.2 -1.3 6.8 0.2 0.1 0.0 
China -2.6 -2.5 -3.0 -1.4 -0.2 0.1 
Indonesia -2.4 -1.1 -2.3 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 
Other East Asia -3.2 -1.2 -2.9 -1.0 -0.3 0.1 
India -2.5 -1.2 -2.0 -1.1 0.0 0.3 
Other South Asia -2.2 -0.9 -1.6 -0.7 0.1 0.2 
South America -3.5 -1.1 -1.8 -0.4 -0.1 0.0 
Mid East Nth Africa -3.6 -1.0 -2.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa -1.9 -0.6 -1.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 
Rest of World -2.8 -0.9 -1.8 -0.7 -0.3 0.0 
 a All prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices. 
 Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text. 
 
 
 
Table 11: “Replacement Migration” - Product and Factor Prices, per cent Departure from the 
Base Line in 2030a 
 
 Land rent Wage Res rent Food Manuf Services 
Australia 113.1 -12.7 60.6 5.3 2.8 -0.5 
North America 183.7 -8.8 102.6 7.7 1.3 -0.1 
Western Europe 80.8 -8.7 31.7 1.0 -0.7 0.4 
Central Europe, FSU -62.6 5.5 -47.2 -8.2 -4.2 0.9 
Japan -26.1 -6.7 -22.3 -3.3 -1.4 0.2 
China -12.8 -7.6 -13.5 -4.7 -0.5 0.5 
Indonesia -8.4 -5.4 -9.7 -3.1 -0.4 0.2 
Other East Asia -33.4 1.0 -29.1 -8.4 -3.1 0.1 
India -12.8 -4.5 -12.9 -5.0 0.1 1.6 
Other South Asia -16.5 -1.2 -13.9 -4.5 0.4 1.7 
South America -21.0 -3.4 -14.7 -2.3 -0.7 0.3 
Mid East Nth Africa -30.9 -2.7 -20.2 -2.7 -2.7 0.0 
Sub-Saharan Africa -15.5 -2.0 -11.1 -1.4 -0.7 0.1 
Rest of World -89.4 65.4 -70.1 -15.7 -9.0 1.2 
 a All prices are measured relative to regional GDP prices. 
 Source:  Simulations of the model described in the text. 
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